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Introduction
In light of debt-levels around the globe reaching historically unprecedented levels, Cochrane (2011), Leeper and Walker (2012) and Sims (2011) have been predicting …scal in ‡ation.
Fiscal theory implies that if government debt is not backed by expected future surpluses, in ‡ation will ensue, immediately or -depending on the maturity structure of debt -in the future (Cochrane, 2001) .
Despite the dire current …scal situation (Figure 1 ), both actual in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations are low by any measure. As a result, policy makers (e.g. the Federal Reserve), academics (e.g. Galí, 2012) and opinion makers (e.g. Krugman) alike dismiss …scal in ‡ation concerns.
Identifying …scal in ‡ation is generally fraught with di¢ culty. There are at least three hurdles that substantially burden identi…cation. First, other things happen: …scal news does not occur in isolation. It typically arrives at times when the economy undergoes other shocks and its instantaneous e¤ects may be quantitatively small relative to those of concurrent shocks. A second hurdle is the formalization of …scal policy. Recent years have brought great progress in modelling the …scal authority, yet no consensus view has emerged. On the one hand, the models grow increasingly complex and involve …scal limits (e.g. Davig, Leeper and Walker, 2011) , policy switches (e.g. Bianchi and Ilut, 2012), or time-varying volatility (e.g. Fernández-Villaverde, Kuester, Guerrón-Quintana and Rubio-Ramírez, 2011) . On the other hand, assumptions on behalf of the …scal authority are frequently seen as ad hoc and models often leave important aspects unmodelled, such as the maturity structure of debt.
The third factor burdening identi…cation is the econometric challenge posed by anticipation.
Commonly used econometric techniques break down when agents respond to information about the future that the econometrician does not have (e.g. L'Huillier, Blanchard and Lorenzoni, 2013; Leeper, Walker and Yang, 2013) . This paper takes a straightforward approach that simultaneously tackles all three chal-lenges. Particularly, we show how the canonical New Keynesian DSGE model (à la Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2007) can help to identify the expected in ‡ationary e¤ect of the current …scal stance. To the workhorse DSGE model, we add the possibility of long-horizon anticipated changes in the model's in ‡ation target.
Future in ‡ationary pressures are identi…ed largely through bond yields and the expectations hypothesis. If agents anticipate in ‡ation down the road, they demand higher yields today on bonds with long maturities. We then simply re-estimate the DSGE model and investigate the properties of the in ‡ation target news shock.
Given theoretically plausible ties between expected in ‡ation and the stance of …scal policy implied by formal models of …scal in ‡ation, we inspect whether the anticipated in ‡ation identi…ed by the DSGE estimation is in any way related to …scal policy. The result is striking.
While the estimation receives no information about …scal variables as debt or de…cits, the identi…ed anticipated long-run component of in ‡ation strongly correlates with innovations to such measures of …scal policy. In fact, the identi…ed part of in ‡ation anticipated in the medium run almost perfectly comoves with debt projections into the future. This strongly suggests there is a discernible low-frequency …scal component to in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations. This bodes well with the story told by …scal in ‡ation "vigilantes": subdued in ‡ation today does not mean it is not coming in the future. In fact, they argue, it is unavoidable down the road: if de…cits are not backed by future surpluses, in ‡ation needs to erode the debt eventually.
The model indicates that the worry of …scal in ‡ation in the US is present today: the accumulation of de…cits since the start of the Bush administration has exerted a permanent upward pressure on in ‡ation of about 1.6%-points. The model also explains why we do not observe …scal in ‡ation concerns in the data today. While there is conditional …scal in ‡ation, supporting the vigilantes'claim, the model shows how that in ‡ationary pressure is dwarfed by disin ‡ationary forces during the Great Recession. Particularly, recessionary slack and the Fed's response to the crisis (forward guidance and quantitative easing) push yields and measured in ‡ation expectations down, which results in invariably low unconditional measures of in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations. Our results thus reconcile the two sides of the debate.
The advantage of our approach immediately relates to the common identi…cation challenges referred to above. First, by its very design the canonical DSGE model controls for a multitude of factors happening in the economy. This enables separating concurrent in ‡uences from in ‡ation anticipation. Second, the model we estimate is essentially void of structure with regard to the …scal authority. While in ‡ation anticipation is identi…ed through estimation, its link with …scal policy is established post estimation. We thus sidestep the challenges that come with formalizing …scal policy. Third, DSGE estimation, by formally taking account of agents'responses to information about the future, is a commonly used solution to Finally, our results complement recent empirical work that argues that the 1970's in ‡ation is related to …scal policy, such as Sims (2011), Bianchi and Ilut (2012) , Bhattarai, Lee and Park (2012) and Kliem, Kriwoluzky and Sarferaz (2013) . The same theoretical models that rationalize the …scal in ‡ation of the 70's rationalize our …ndings. The crucial di¤erence with our work is that we show there is a current expectation of in ‡ation that is related to …scal policy, while in the 70's in ‡ation actually materialized at the same time …scal policy was loose.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 …rst brie ‡y describes the DSGE model, which is essentially Smets and Wouters (2007) coupled with the expectations hypothesis of interest rates. We then lay out the key identifying feature of our approach. Section 3 contains the main results. In Section 4 we use the model to quantify both sides of the debate.
The relevance of our results for the macroeconomy is discussed in Section 5. We evaluate robustness in Section 6 and subsequently conclude. 4 
The model
The model we use is a close variant of Smets and Wouters (2007) . As in De Graeve, Emiris and Wouters (2009, henceforth DEW), we append a term structure of interest rates to the Smets-Wouters model and allow for a time-varying in ‡ation target. The dynamics of modelimplied yields are fully determined by the expectations hypothesis.
In addition to these features, this paper adds news shocks to the model's long-run in ‡ation target. Formally, we capture this by allowing the in ‡ation target, t , expressed in deviations from steady state, to evolve as
The target essentially evolves as a random walk. Positive values of imply smoother changes in the target, relative to a random walk. Traditional, non-anticipated in ‡ation target shocks are captured by t . Target news shocks are captured by t i , a random innovation in t i that materializes in t. A detailed description of the full log-linearized model can be found in the Appendix.
An in ‡ation target news shock, t i ; has the distinguishing feature documented in Figure   2 . Particularly, it is the only shock that can generate contemporaneous movements in long rates without a¤ecting short rates. Other shocks in DSGE models cannot generate such a pattern. On the one hand, typical business cycle shocks generate movements in the slope of the yield curve through changes in short rates while leaving long rates una¤ected. Figure 3 exempli…es this pattern by plotting the response to standard monetary policy shocks. 1 On the other hand, traditional in ‡ation target shocks imply a level shift across interest rates of di¤erent maturities. The response to such a non-anticipated target shock, t , is contained in Figure 4 .
Thus, key to identifying news to long-run in ‡ation is the combination of using information on the yield curve and allowing for in ‡ation anticipation. Through the expectations hypothesis, the model interprets surprise increases in long-term interest rates, independent of short rates, as anticipated in ‡ationary pressure down the road.
We estimate the model using Bayesian methods. Our sample period starts in 1966:Q1
and ends in 2011:Q2. The data used for the estimation is an update of that in DEW and consists of the log di¤erence of real GDP, real consumption, real investment and the real wage, log hours worked, the log di¤erence of the GDP de ‡ator and the federal funds rate. The observable bond yields are four zero coupon bonds with maturities of one, three, …ve and ten years. A detailed description of the data can be found in the Appendix. Prior distributions are the same as in DEW and also presented in the Appendix. The only parameter which is new in this paper is the standard error of the news shocks which, similar to other shocks, is
given an Inverse-Gamma prior distribution with a mean of 0.01 and two degrees of freedom.
In the baseline model we set the anticipation horizon to …ve years, while we study alternative horizons in Section 6.
As in DEW, the empirical speci…cation allows for deviations of model-implied yields from actual yields in two ways. First, we include free constants to capture the mean of the yields.
Second, the measurement equations for the yields are augmented with measurement errors.
In general, our estimation results are very similar to those in DEW. Hence, in what follows, we primarily focus on the properties of the news shocks.
Anticipated in ‡ation and …scal policy
Section 2 laid out how in ‡ation target news shocks generate a pattern of responses that is absent in contemporary DSGE models. The same impulse response functions are, however, also perfectly in line with anticipated …scal in ‡ation. In fact, Figure 2 is the estimated model equivalent of Figure 8 in Cochrane (2011) , which represents the latter's most likely scenario 6 of how in ‡ation will materialize following a shock to expected …scal surpluses. 2 In addition, Leeper and Walker (2012) show how government bond valuation depends naturally on the present value of future in ‡ation, which is intimately tied to the in ‡ation target. Given these theoretically plausible ties between in ‡ation target news shocks in our model and explicit models of …scal policy, we now inspect whether the anticipated in ‡ation identi…ed by the DSGE estimation is in any way related to …scal policy. Figure 5 plots the estimated time series for the news shock (solid/blue line). In addition, the …gure plots one measure of …scal policy surprises. Particularly, the dashed/red line depicts the smoothed innovations to an AR (1) for the primary de…cit-to-GDP ratio. Other measures of …scal policy innovations (which control for automatic stabilizers or are based on debt data) convey a similar message and are contained in Section 6. Strikingly, while the estimation receives no information about …scal policy, the news shock strongly correlates with it. The correlation over the full sample is 0.44, and increases to 0.70 after 1984, the start of the "Great Moderation". Incidentally, this is also the time when the level of government debt rose above 30% of GDP (see Figure 1 ). It also coincides with a sharp increase in the maturity of government debt (e.g. Greenwood, Hanson and Stein, 2012) , which in models of …scal in ‡ation leads to longer anticipation horizons (Cochrane, 2011) . contribution is now at an all time high and is also high relative to the level of in ‡ation. The 2016:Q2 in ‡ation forecast conditional on only news shocks is 2.8%, re ‡ecting an increase of 1.6%-points in the last ten years.
The rapid increase in debt during the last decade witnessed in Figure 1 provides one candidate explanation for the increase in anticipated in ‡ation. To shed more light on that, Figure 7 compares the news shock contribution to in ‡ation with projected debt-to-GDP …ve years ahead, as reported by the Congressional Budget O¢ ce (CBO). The observed increase in debt projections aligns almost perfectly with the model's assessment of anticipated in ‡ation.
From a theoretical perspective, the gradual rise in in ‡ation conditional on news shocks is reminiscent of how …scal in ‡ation plays out in models of the "…scal limit", as in Davig et al. (2011) .
In light of the above evidence it seems hard to dispute there is an anticipated component estimation of switching models, provided they incorporate yield curve data, will explain the recent years by an increased probability of switching to an active …scal regime.
Revisiting the debate
We now address why one does not observe …scal in ‡ation in data on in ‡ation expectations or yields. Figure 8 plots the decomposition of the …ve year yield during the Great Reces-8 sion. 3 On the one hand, the current recession implies slack is very high. The persistent disin ‡ationary e¤ect of all the macro shocks -which jointly explain slack in the modelis captured by the magenta/starred line: slack exerts a substantial downward pressure on in ‡ation expectations and thus on yields. On the other hand, central bank actions geared toward lowering yields of longer maturity (forward guidance and QE) imply a level e¤ect on the term structure which can only be captured by regular in ‡ation target shocks, measured by the blue/diamond line. 4 As a result, in ‡ation expectations derived from yields -through the expectations hypothesis -are subdued, too. In this way, the presence of slack as well as the Fed's crisis response push in ‡ation, its expectations and yields down. As a result, even though there is substantial conditional anticipated …scal in ‡ation, measured by the red/circled line, absent a model one does not measure it in observed data.
Discussion
We have so far focused on the relation between news about the in ‡ation target and …scal policy. The historical decomposition in Figure 8 already suggested that factors other than in ‡ation anticipation are important in understanding yields and in ‡ation expectations during the Great Recession. This holds on a broader level, too: target news shocks do not matter much in an unconditional sense, not for yields (around 3%), nor for macro ‡uctuations (< 1%). Recall that news became more important in the last decade, as corroborated by the historical contributions in Figures 6 and 8 . The quantitatively small role of news shocks implies that there is only a limited impact on other features of the model compared to the results in DEW. The fact that these anticipated shocks matter very little for macrodynamics is consistent with models of …scal/monetary interactions, such as e.g. Bianchi and
Ilut's (2012) policy switches or Sims'(2011) hyper-rational expectations, so long as there is a small probability attached to switching to the active …scal policy regime. Put di¤erently, if …scal in ‡ation receives some probability but does not materialize, these models often imply limited macro consequences.
Robustness
We here evaluate the robustness of the link between anticipated in ‡ation and …scal policy.
First we compare the estimated series of in ‡ation target news shocks to alternative measures of …scal innovations. Next, we change the anticipation horizon of agents in the model.
Measures of …scal policy
The comovement between target news shocks and …scal policy does not depend on a particular measure of …scal policy. We check the robustness of our results by comparing the estimated news shocks to di¤erent measures of …scal surprises. In addition to our benchmark measure -innovations to an AR(1) on the primary de…cit-to-GDP ratio -, we use three other measures that control for "automatic stabilizers". Automatic stabilizers are systematic changes in revenues and outlays that are attributable to cyclical movements in real output and unemployment. Table 1 shows the correlation between the in ‡ation news shocks estimated by the DSGE model and the di¤erent measures of …scal news. A …rst measure replaces the primary de…cit with CBO data of government de…cits without automatic stabilizers. A second measure controls for automatic stabilizers by adding the output gap (as implied by the DSGE model) to the autoregression, while a third measure controls for output growth. The bottom two rows of Table 1 consider two additional alternative proxies. The …rst scales the primary de…cit by debt instead of GDP. The second considers innovations to the debt-to-GDP ratio. In all cases we use smoothed residuals of the regressions to control for high-frequency variation.
All measures show a substantial correlation with target news shocks, especially during the "Great Moderation"-period. This con…rms our main result, namely the high correlation between long-horizon in ‡ation anticipation and …scal surprises. As noted before, the period with the highest correlation is also that in which both the level and the maturity of government debt increased markedly. Theory suggests the concern for …scal in ‡ation (anticipation) is largest then (Cochrane, 2011) .
Additionally, Figure 9 plots the estimated in ‡ation target news shocks together with dates of major legislative announcements on federal income taxes and defense expenditures, as reported in Yang (2007) and Ramey (2011) , respectively. Vertical lines above zero mark positive surprises to the de…cit while lines below zero correspond to negative shocks. Note that since these measures of …scal policy only pertain to parts of the budget, they should be seen as indicative, rather than representative of the entire …scal stance. Nonetheless, Figure   9 suggests there is a relation between the chronology of de…cit surprises and our measure of in ‡ation target news shocks.
Anticipation horizon
To evaluate the importance of the assumption that in ‡ation target news arrives …ve years ahead, we re-estimate the model for di¤erent anticipation horizons. Table 2 reports the correlation between the estimated news shocks in those models and our benchmark measure of news to …scal de…cits. At short and long horizons, there is no evident relation between the two series. However, there is a relatively strong positive correlation between target news shocks and …scal surprises in the medium term, at anticipation horizons of 4 and 5 years.
Interestingly, these horizons correspond well with the maturity of US debt, which averaged between 4 and 5 years over our sample period (see e.g. Greenwood et al., 2012) . This is consistent with Cochrane (2001 Cochrane ( , 2011 who shows that the extent to which …scal in ‡ation can be pushed into the future (i.e. our anticipation horizon) is intimately tied to the maturity 11 of government debt.
Concluding remarks
The model identi…es an anticipated part of the in ‡ation target in the canonical NK-DSGE model. While there exist alternative interpretations for the evolution of target in ‡ation, the basic Sargent and Wallace (1981) arithmetic suggests …scal policy to be a particularly plausible one. The fact that the evolution of anticipated target changes aligns very well with measures of …scal policy lends credibility to …scal in ‡ation concerns.
In the model …scal in ‡ation is entirely exogenous. It implies that monetary policy cannot counter it and that -while not necessarily the most likely scenario -post-crisis the US may be stuck with an inconveniently high level of in ‡ation.
As a …nal caveat, note that the purpose of the model is identifying anticipated in ‡ation and evaluating whether it is related to …scal policy. The model we estimate is essentially void of structure when it comes to the modelling of the …scal authority. This has the advantage that we avoid making highly debatable assumptions on behalf of the …scal policy maker, but also that we can resort to standard DSGE model estimation, thus avoiding the pitfalls of alternative econometric methods in the face of anticipation. At the same time, the model takes no particular stance on the desirability of various policy options. 
